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Although a number of methods have been proposed to control for word-count differences between truthful and deceptive accounts, there is no uniformity amongst researchers using the Reality Monitoring criteria as to when, why or how to standardise for word-count differences. Another factor that also has received little attention in the literature is whether the number of others present when a person is providing an account alters the lexical profile of accounts such that Reality Monitoring scores are affected. To investigate these issues, 62 autobiographical statements, 31 truthful and 31 deceptive, were generated under three conditions, no person present, one, and two persons present, and were analysed before and after standardisation for word-count and duration. Results showed that the criteria successfully discriminated between truthful and deceptive accounts when no attempt to control for word-count was made and, to a lesser extent, when accounts were standardised for duration; however, they failed to discriminate after accounts had been standardised for length. The presence of others did not affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts. The results highlight the difficulties involved in developing normative standardisation criteria which could be used in the field to classify individual or small numbers of cases. 
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Introduction
Traditionally, in the area of lie-detection, non-verbal behaviours have tended to attract more attention from both researchers and lay people than verbal behaviours (Vrij, 2008a). Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that over-reliance on non-verbal cues, such as those ostensibly related to ‘nervousness’, may actually inhibit accurate detection (Colwell, Miller, Miller & Lyons, 2006; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). In contrast, a number of findings suggest that a focus on or use of the verbal cues and the content of the subjects’ accounts is more likely to improve the lie-detection ability than an emphasis on non-verbal indicators of deceit (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij et al, 2010).  Thus a variety of studies examining verbal cues to deception in both experimental (Porter & Yuille, 1996; Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000) and field situations (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002; Vrij & Mann, 2001a; 2001b) have indicated that such cues may boost lie-detection accuracy beyond chance level.
	Of a number of verbal lie-detection techniques available, two, in particular, appear to have received robust empirical support, both in terms of reliability and construct and empirical validity; namely Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (RM) (for reviews see Bogaard, Meijer & Vrij, 2014; Granhag, Strömwall & Landström, 2006; Masip, Sporer, Garrido & Herrero,  2005; Vrij, 2008a, 2008b; Vrij et al, 2000). Together, these techniques use a number of cues that have been shown to be useful in distinguishing between truthful and fabricated accounts; for example, perceptual information (Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2014), temporal and spatial information (Amado, Arce & Farina, 2015; Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2015), quantity of details (Amado et al, 2015), and logical structure (Granhag et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it seems likely that a number of moderators may mediate the effectiveness of these techniques.  For example, so far, meta-analytical studies have indicated that when applying these techniques, consideration should be given to moderators such as the paradigm and designs used, the experience of coders scoring the criteria, motivational factors, and the modalitywhether the statements evaluated were spoken or written, statements were accessed and scales utilised for coding (Amado et al., 2015; Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008b). However, perhaps surprisingly, it appears that research using RM and CBCA has systematically failed to address whether and how to handle a possible key moderator, that of word-count. This is despite the fact that word-count per se has been considered by many to be a cue to deception in its own right; i.e. truthful accounts tend to be longer  (Dilmon, 2009; Driscell, Blickensderfer & Salas, 2013; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012;  Santtila, Roppola, & Niemi., 1998; Stromwall, Bengtsson, Leander & Granhag, 2004; Stromwall & Granhag, 2005;  Vrij, Evans, Akehurst & Mann, 2004;  Vrij, et al.,2000). Indeed, word-count has been used to define the CBCA criterion quantity of details; i.e. more details are found in genuine accounts (Lamb, Stenberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, Orbach & Hovav, 1997; Santtila, Roppola, Runtti & Niemi, 2000). 
Failure to consider this variable systematically has given rise to a number of problems. For example, if ignored, when using raw frequencies to score RM or CBCA criteria, the number of occasions a particular criterion is present, and word-count or account length, are inevitably confounded (Granhag et al., 2006; Strömwall et al., 2004). One possible way round this, might be to standardise accounts for word-count, but there does not appear to be a clear, theory-driven rationale to support decisions to standardise for word-count; instead, researchers seem to rely on implicit criteria for doing so (for a review, see Elntib, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2014). Moreover, even if the decision is made to standardise, there seems little agreement on how to do this; for example, methods reported in the literature have included standardising scores per 100 or 50 account-words, or per account duration in minutes, and even transforming raw frequency scores into ratings using the median score to dichotomize the RM scores into a two-point scale; (i.e. with scores below the median are assigned getting a 0, and scores above the median are assigned getting a 1, ((Larson & Granhag, 2005; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher., 2015; Vrij et al, 2000; Stromwall et al., 2004  Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull 2004; Vrij et al., 2000; Memon, Fraser, Colwell,  Odinot & Mastroberardino 2010; Vrij et al., 2008; Gnisci, Caso, & Vrij, 2010). But, in any case, it could be argued that there is something paradoxical about attempting to remove the influence of a variable that can, in itself, be used as a cue to deception.	 In view of this, Given these considerations, the first aim of the present study was to reconsider the influence word count, and its standardisation, on the efficacy of an RM procedure for detecting untruthful accounts. It was decided to concentrate on RM rather than CBCA, as many consider RM to have advantages both in terms of theoretical underpinnings (Masip et al., 2005) and practical efficiency; CBCA is more labour-intensive to administer and contains twice as many criteria with no clear diagnostic advantage (see Bogaard et al; Granhag et al., 2006; Masip, et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008a, 2008b; Vrij et al, 2000). 
	It can be noted that the issue of standardising for word count is particularly contentious in the case the RM approach which was originally formulated on the fundamental idea that genuine memories will contain more external and less internal characteristics than imagined memories (Johnson & Raye, 1981). As such, there is no reference in the original RM research literature to the density of various kinds of information within accounts (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). Rather the theory proposes simply that truthful accounts will overall contain ‘more perceptual, spatial and temporal, semantic and affective information and less information about cognitive operations’ (Johnson et al., 1993, p.4). It could be argued, therefore, that standardising raw RM scores (i.e. the frequency with which examples of each of the RM criteria is found in a statement) per 100 words, or according to some other standardisation formula, is not actually justified by the original theory. In fact, by the same token, it could be argued that, in general, with the exception of cognitive information, one would expect that accounts possessing ‘more perceptual, spatial and temporal, semantic and affective information’ to be longer than those not possessing such information; hence there is no obvious reason for excluding word-count per se as an additional RM criterion, as it could be considered to be an indirect or proxy measure of total RM scores. 
	Accordingly, it does not necessarily follow that standardising for word count will improve the efficacy of RM in detecting lies; and, indeed, in the few RM studies where results before and after standardisation for word-count are presented, the trend has been for unstandardised raw frequency scores to be more predictive of deception, at least for some of the RM criteria (Elntib, 2016; Elntib et al., 2014; Larson & Granhag, 2005; Masip et al., 2005). 
The present study attempted, therefore, to build on these findings by looking again, systematically, at the effects of standardising for word count on the efficacy of RM, but also considering the effects of another potential objective characteristic of accounts that might be useful as an indicator of  deception,  duration (in minutes).  Like word-count, ‘response duration’ has also been proposed as a lie detection cue in its own right (DePaulo et al., 2003; Elntib, 2016; Elntib et al., 2014; Gnisci et al., 2010). However, although standardisation for duration has been applied to a very limited extent in past research (see, for example, Gnisci et al., 2010), its application has been somewhat ad hoc, and, as yet, no study has systematically compared the efficacy of RM criteria before and after standardisation for duration, or compared the effects of standardisation for duration with standardisation for word-count and no standardisation (i.e. raw frequencies).
Another potential moderator that appears to have been more or less completely neglected in previous research in this area is the number of people present when an account is provided; i.e. whether the presence of others alters the lexical profile of accounts such that RM scores are affected. What little research there has been that could be construed as relevant to this topic has tended to focus on changes in the lexical density of accounts. For example, there is some evidence that triadic interactions in interviews can lead to discourse that contains a higher number of words; thus both interviewers and interviewees may independently produce more words in triads than when in groups of two (Driskell et al, 2013). Given the findings that longer accounts tend to produce higher RM scores, one might, therefore, expect the presence of others to result in longer accounts (in terms of both the number of words and duration), i.e. more words and/or longer duration) accounts, therebyconsequently increasing overall RM scores. However, the study by Driskell et al. involved accounts given during interactive discussions and did not involve manipulating deception. This contrasts with standard RM procedures which typically require participants to give uninterrupted free-recall accounts of past events which may be fabricated. The direct relevance of this work of this kind to RM studies of deception is, therefore, somewhat questionable. Nevertheless, in principle, the idea that the presence of others may affect the RM scores could be considered at least plausible if we consider more general psychological theorising and research in the area of social influences on performance, such as Zajonc’s seminal work on social inhibition and facilitation. 
Zajonc (1965, 1980) proposed, and found evidence to support the view that, compared to when working alone, the presence of others inhibits performance on some tasks and facilitates performance on others. Such tasks have been categorised in a number of ways but, typically, social inhibition has been shown to occur most frequently when tasks are complex, involve novel stimuli, require the suppression of dominant responses and require the detection and correction of errors, whereas social facilitation occurs when the opposite conditions exist (see Wagstaff et al., 2008). Zajonc’s main explanation for these effects was in terms of the selective enhancement and suppression of dominant responses; however, Wagstaff et al. have argued that the effects are perhaps better accommodated in terms of more modern conceptions of Working Memory. Within the latter framework, tasks subject to social inhibition can be defined as ‘executive tasks’, and, as such, social inhibition effects can then be explained by the effects of the presence of others on executive functioning. For instance, it could be argued that any threat to well-being may necessitate careful executive monitoring of the situation in order to select appropriate strategies for ‘fight or flight’. From a sociobiological perspective, human groups, especially strangers, may be perceived as a potential source of threat; consequently, if the executive system is activated by being in a group, one might predict that an executive task would be performed less well in a group situation; precisely in the same way as the administration of two executive tasks concurrently inhibits performance on one or both tasks (Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997). However, at the same time, this might also 'free up' other ‘fight or flight’ systems to respond automatically to environmental threat, without any intervention from a supervisory system. In other words, being in the presence of others, of itself, may increase cognitive load, resulting in the inhibition performance on executive tasks, but the facilitation of performance on non-executive tasks. In support of this proposal, Wagstaff et al. found that the presence of others decreased performance on an executive phonemic fluency task, whilst enhancing performance on a non-executive, more automatic confidence-accuracy task. Moreover, these effects were enhanced as more people were present. Given this, one might predict that being in a room with others (at least in a verbally non-interactive context) would be associated with higher cognitive load, resulting in slower speech rate and shorter accounts with consequent lower overall RM scores, regardless of whether accounts are truthful or not. At the same time, however, one might expect that the presence of others, if it increases cognitive load, might allow a better discrimination between truthful from deceptive accounts using RM criteria.. This would follow from research which suggests that, as lying is a cognitively demanding task, increasing  cognitive load, such as requiring participants to recalling in reverse order,  may improve the ability of judges to detect lies using RM, as well as other criteria (Vrij, 2008b; Vrij et al., 2008; Walczyk et al., 2012). The idea here, therefore, is that producing a false account full of the kinds of details tapped by the RM criteria is a difficult task at the best of times; it is made even more difficult, however, if one has to do this in the presence of others.  In other words, the rationale underlying our predictions for the presence of others was essentially the same as that used by Vrij and others in studies using the reverse order mnemonic i.e. a) telling lies requires more cognitive effort than telling the truth; b) the presence of others increases cognitive load; therefore, ergo, c) applying additional cognitive load to liars and non-liars (by having others present) will make the task especially difficult for the liars (because telling lies is, in itself, cognitively more demanding) and, thereby, aid the task of differentiating between liars and non-liars. Given these considerations, the effects of the presence of others on the efficacy of RM wereas also considered in the present study. 





An opportunity sample of 31 undergraduate students (mean age = 24.12; SD = 9.05) was employed as Stimulus Participants (SPs) to generate accounts; there were 12 males and 19 females. There were no exclusion criteria other than that participants had to be older than 17 years old. All participants volunteered in response to an advertisement posted on the University website. No reimbursement was offered. 

Materials and Procedure
The study was conducted in two phases. The materials and procedure were similar to that outlined in Elntib et al. (2014). Initially, the stimulus participants (SPs) were invited to take part in a lie-detection study. The participants were unknown to the experimenter and the exact purpose of the study was unknown to them. All SPs were presented with an adaptation of the Life Experiences Inventory (LEI) as used by Garry, Manning, Loftus and Sherman (1996) and Paddock et al. (1999), which requires participants to generate  autobiographical memories; autobiographical accounts have been used as stimulus materials in numerous lie-detection studies (see for example, Ball & O’Callaghan, 2008; Barnier, Sharman, McKay & Sporer 2005; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye 1988; Masip et al., 2005; Santtila et al., 1998; Sporer & Sharman, 2006). The LEI protocol listed three types of events, 1) having an indoors or outdoors accident, 2) being attacked by an insect/animal, and 3) having an unpleasant medical operation. Some examples of the first and third categories were also provided (such as sports injury, pet run over by a car, lost in a public space for more than an hour, home broken into, painful dental surgery). Stimulus Participants were instructed to look at the list of the three types of event, consider if they had previously experienced any of them, and then to perform two tasks according to the following instructions. 
First, ‘Please describe, in as much detail as possible, one of these events that you have experienced in the form of a narrative. If you realise that you have been involved in more than one of these events, please describe the one you remember the best. Your response will be audio recorded and timed. Feel free to ask as many questions as you wish before the task starts BUT remember that no questions will be answered after the timer starts’. 
And second, ‘Please identify which of these events you have never experienced. Please identify only one of the events you have never experienced and generate an imaginary story around it. In other words, please create a whole fictitious story and enrich it with as many details as possible to make it look like a genuinely true experience. We would like you to talk about this event so that if someone who did not know whether this event had happened to you were to read your account, they would believe that this event had in fact happened to you. Please remember that your accounts should be freely invented. You should not describe friends’ experiences, events taken from books or films, personal experiences that had been modified. Your response will be audio recorded and timed. Feel free to ask as many questions as you wish before the task starts BUT remember that no questions will be answered after the timer starts’.  When describing a truthful event, participants were also reminded to report an event only of which they were certain.
Within the constraints of the sample size, participants were handed the instructions for each condition in a counterbalanced order (i.e. half of the participants were first handed the instructions for the truthful accounts or vice versa). Participants were not given a specific time to prepare but had access to the three general categories of events before they signed a consent form and while they were going through a participant information sheet; about 10 mins before they produced the accounts. There was no participant who could not think of an event, so 62 accounts were produced, consisting of 31 truthful and 31 deceptive statements. Of the truthful accounts, 25 involved an indoors/outdoors accident, three involved an attack from an animal/insect and three were about having an unpleasant medical operation.  Of the deceptive accounts, 21 involved an indoors/outdoors accident, seven involved an attack from an animal/insect and three were about having an unpleasant medical operation.   
	Participants were asked to report their accounts orally in three independent conditions: when alone (n = 10), with one interviewer in the room (n = 10), and with two interviewers in the room (n = 11). After the free recollection of the event was initiated, no further interaction took place between interviewer(s) and interviewee. In the third condition, where SPs were joined by two persons in the room, no interaction at all took place between the second interviewers and the interviewee; however, the second interviewer was introduced as a note-keeper at the beginning of the session. All accounts were (audio) recorded and timed, and subsequently transcribed. 
	The accounts were then coded using the RM framework developed and used by  Elntib et al. (2014). This consisted of a list of five RM criteria (perceptual information, cognitive operations, temporal information, spatial information and affective information) and a set of descriptions of their definitions derived from Vrij (2000; 2008; 2015). As in this study the main aim was to assess the effect of standardisation on RM raw frequency-scores, these five criteria were used because they are the only ones that allow coders to score the number of occasions the criteria were present in the statements (vividness, realism and reconstructability are global criteria that cannot be assessed in the form of simple frequency counts). The protocol required coders to score numerically the number of occasions where perceptual information, cognitive operations, temporal information, spatial information and affective information was present. This resulted in a score for each criterion and a total criterion score. The criteria (with examples) were defined to the coders as follows. 
1. Perceptual Information: the presence sensorial experiences such as sounds (e.g. ‘he really shouted at him’) or visual details (e.g. ‘I saw him entering the room’). 
2. Spatial information: the presence of information about locations (e.g. ‘It was in a park’) or the spatial arrangement of people/objects (e.g. ‘the man was sitting left from his wife’ or ‘the lamp was partially hidden behind the curtains’). 
3. Remembered feelings (affect): how well the person remembers feelings (accounts of subjective mental states) from the event (e.g. ‘Joseph was very scared’).1
4. Cognitive operations: evidence in the narratives of various cognitive activities, such as thoughts or reasoning (e.g ‘I must have had my coat on, as it was very cold that night’) and cognitive suppositions of sensory experiences (e.g. ‘She seemed quite clever’). This criterion also includes descriptions of inferences made by the participant at the time of the event (e.g. ‘it made me think at the moment how nice it could be If I have never been there’).
5. Temporal information: the presence of information about when the event happened (e.g. ‘it was early in the morning’) or explicitly describing a sequence of events (e.g. ‘as soon as the guy entered the pub the girl started smiling’).
   The coders were two postgraduate research students in Forensic Psychology both of whom had received extensive training in coding cues to deception and had previous knowledge of RM-based lie-detection procedures. The principal coder scored all accounts, whereas the secondary coder randomly scored 25% of the accounts. Intra-class correlation agreement and Pearson’s correlations showed that, in terms of applying the RM criteria to the various measures, there was high and significant inter-coder agreement between the two judges (ICC = .82 - .91; r = .79 - .90). Considering the very good inter-coder agreement for the random sample, frequency counts produced by the principal coder were used in all analyses.

Design
To summarize, a 3 x 2 mixed design was used (presence of others: no/ one/ or two people present in the room x truthfulness: truthful/deceptive event) with repeated measures on the second independent variable. The dependent variables were the five RM criteria frequency scores (unstandardised, standardised per 100 words, and standardised for duration), the Total RM scores, word-count and duration. 

Results
Preliminary analyses found no effects of the order in which the accounts were presented (deceptive first or truthful first) on any of dependent variables. 

Preliminary analyses of word-count and duration 
The number of words contained in the accounts was strongly and positively correlated with the duration of accounts in seconds.  This was found for both truthful (r = .95, p < .001). and deceptive accounts (r = .95, p < .001). The data for word count and duration were further analysed using two 3 x 2 (presence of others: no one/one/two persons present x truthfulness: truthful/deceptive) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. Results showed that truthful accounts contained significantly more words (M = 376.45, SD = 236.47) than deceptive accounts (M = 281.55, SD = 223.88); F (1,28) = 11.826, p = .002; η2p = .30. Similarly, truthful accounts were longer in duration, i.e. time spent in seconds to produce them (M = 137.16, SD = 74.79), than deceptive accounts (M = 106.84, SD = 66.47); F (1,28) = 13.67, p = .001; η2p = .33. Moreover, the effect sizes, both of which are large, indicate that, as predictors of veracity, both measures (word count and duration) appeared to be more or less equally effective in differentiating between truthful and deceptive accounts.  
Significant main effects were also found for presence of others for both account length F (2,28) = 7.37, p = .003; η2p  = .34 and account duration F (2,28) = 5.25, p = .012; η2p  = .27. Further Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests showed that accounts generated in a room with one person present were significantly longer in terms of the number of words they contained (M = 510.00, SD = 287.76) than accounts generated in a room with no persons present (M = 218.85, SD = 298.38), p =.004, or  two persons present (M = 264.59, SD = 96.30), p =.014). No other between-group differences for account length were found. Similarly, accounts generated in a room with one person present were significantly longer in duration measured in seconds (M = 171.20, SD = 87.94) than accounts generated in a room with no persons present (M = 91.10, SD = 40.64), p =.014, but only marginally longer in duration than accounts produced when two persons were present (M = 105.36, SD = 49.78), p =.05. No other group differences were found for duration. There were no significant interaction effects for either analysis; F(2,28) values were, respectively, 1.96 and 1.04 for the word-count x presence of others and duration x presence of others interactions, p >.10). 
	To summarise, overall the accounts produced in a room with one person contained more words and tended to be longer in duration than the accounts produced in the other two conditions; however, the largest differences were found between  the conditions where participants were alone and where one person was present. Contrary to predictions, there were no clear differences between accounts from participants who were in a room with two persons and those who were alone. Moreover, the lack of significant interactions indicated that the presence of others did not affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using these criteria. 

RM frequency results before word-count standardisation














	As predicted, before standardisation, mean scores were higher for the truthful accounts for all RM criteria with the exception of cognitive operations. Of those, significant effects were found for Total RM scores, F(1,28) = 28.34, p = .001, perceptual information F(1,28) = 5.24; p = .030, spatial information F(1,28) = 17.46, p = .001 and temporal information F(1,28) = 12.73, p = .001.  The effect for affective information also approached significance, F(1,28) = 4.06, p = .053.















Only one significant interaction between truthfulness and presence of others was found, that for affective information F(2,28) = 3.94, p =.032; η2p =. 22. Further post-hoc t test comparisons between the truthful and deceptive accounts showed a significant effect only for the two persons present condition and this was in the direction predicted by RM theory; i.e. affective information scores for truthful accounts were higher (M = 4.36, SD = 3.61) than for deceptive accounts (M = 1.54, SD = 1.69), in the two persons present condition (p <.05).  F values for all other interactions, F (2,28), ranged between 1.16 and 1.81, and none approached significance, p > .10; so otherwise, the absence of significant interactions indicated again that the presence of others did not affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using the RM criteria.

 RM frequency results after word-count standardisation 
Standardisation per 100 words: To standardise word-count, the RM raw scores were re-calculated per 100 words of account; i.e. raw frequencies per 100 words (for examples of this method, see Elntib et al., 2014; Larsson & Granhag, 2005; Strömwall & Granhag, 2005). The analysis used in the previous section was then repeated. None of the main effects for truthful and deceptive accounts was significant with the exception of cognitive information, which, as predicted, was higher in deceptive accounts, F(1,28) = 12.44, p = .001 (see Table 1).  
Main effects for presence of others were found only for the criteria of perceptual information F(2,28) = 10.55, p = .001, and cognitive information, F(2,28) = 4.43, p = .021; no other group differences were found (Table 2). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests found that accounts generated in a room where no person was present were richer in perceptual information than accounts generated in a room with one person present (p < .001). Also, accounts produced when no-one was present were also richer in cognitive information than accounts generated in a room with two persons present (p < .05).  F(2,28) values for all other interactions ranged between 1.19 and 1.29, and none approached significance,  p > .10. 
These results show a fairly clear divergence from those found with the unstandardised scores in terms of both statistical significance and effect sizes; i.e. the ability to discriminate between truthful and deceptive accounts is generally reduced; also, the influence of the one person present condition seems to be replaced by a (lesser) influence of being alone. But again, and perhaps most notably, the presence of others did not appear to affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using these criteria.  

Standardisation per duration of accounts: To standardise for duration, the RM raw scores were re-calculated per minute of account (i.e. RM scores were divided by the total duration of accounts in minutes). In accordance with the method used by Vrij et al. (2008), latency period (the time-interval between the interviewer’s question and the answer) was not taken into account. The same overall analysis used in the previous sections was then conducted.
Significant main effects for truthfulness were found for Total RM scores, F(1,28) = 9.70, p = .004; temporal information, F(1,28) = 9.70, p = .006 and cognitive information, F(1,28) = 9.81, p = .004, in the directions predicted by RM theory (see Table 1). It appears, therefore, that although when compared to using unstandardised raw frequencies, standardising for duration appeared to reduce the diagnostic validity of RM (effect sizes were generally lower), nevertheless, the RM criteria could still discriminate between truthful and deceptive accounts using this measure.  
A main effect for presence of others was found only for cognitive information F(2,28) = 3.43, p = .047 (Table 3); Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests found that none of the pairwise comparisons was significant (p > .05);  however, the means indicated that cognitive information frequency counts after standardisation for duration were lowest in the two person condition (the other two conditions differed little). None of the interactions was significant; F(2,28) values ranged between 1.32-2.75, p  >.05; so once again, the presence of others did not differentially affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using these criteria.  
 
Discussion
In accordance with results from previous studies (DePaulo et al., 2003; Porter & Yuille, 1996; Vrij et al., 2000), in the present study truth-tellers’ accounts were longer in duration and word-count than those of liars, thus further endorsing the possible use of these measures as cues to deception in verbal accounts; i.e.  Hypothesis 1 was supported.  The present results also showed that when one interviewer was present, the accounts tended to be longer, both in terms of their duration in time and length, than when no or two interviewers were present. Significantly, however, the presence of others did not affect the ability to detect deception when applying these measures; i.e.  Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
	 Before standardisation, the RM results appeared to follow a similar pattern; in accordance with the predictions of RM theory, mean scores were higher for the truthful accounts for all RM criteria with the exception of cognitive operations, and most were significant, or nearly significant in this respect. Also, there was again a general trend for RM scores to be highest for accounts generated with one person present. However, the presence of others did not affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using the RM criteria.
	However, the results when standardised for word-count showed a general reduction in the ability of RM criteria to discriminate between truthful and deceptive accounts. Also, the influence of the one person present condition seemed to disappear; and once again, the presence of others did not appear to affect the ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive accounts using these criteria. In some respects, however, the situation was reversed or redeemed to some extent when standardisation for duration was applied. Compared to unstandardised raw frequencies, standardising for duration appeared to reduce the diagnostic validity of RM, i.e. effect sizes were generally lower, but it was still somewhat better than when standardisation for word-count was applied. Hypothesis 3 was, therefore, supported in as much as unstandardised RM scores did overall discriminate better between truthful and deceptive accounts. 
It seems, therefore, that the efficacy of RM assessments measured by recording frequencies may vary not only according to whether standardisation is applied, but also the type of standardisation used. However, the issue still remains as to why differences occurred between the two methods of standardisation (word-count and duration)..  One possible explanation is a follows. As pointed out earlier, the basic rationale for avoiding standardisation for word count is that it makes little sense to correct for word-count if length per se is considered to be a reliable cue to deception (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman & Memon 2002; Elntib et al., 2014; Memon et al., 2010); i.e. it could be argued that standardising for word-count differences alters one of the core qualities of truths; i.e. they generally contain more detailed information. This, in turn, might help explain the difference between the results for the two standardisation methods; for whereas standardisation for number of words clearly negates the core quality of ‘more information’ and thus more details relevant to RM criteria in accounts, standardisation according to duration (RM criteria per minute) may be less likely to do so. This is because, as Elntib et al. (2014) have shown, truthful accounts also tend to reflect a faster speed rate.; tThus truth-tellers are able to relate the information they have at a faster rate and are thus able to report more details within the time units under consideration. An analysis of the present results in terms of speech rate supports this interpretation; truthful accounts were also more fluent, producing significantly more words per second (M = 2.71, SD = 0.49) than deceptive accounts (M = 2.58, SD = 0.56); F (1,28) = 4.45, p = .044; η2p = .14. It is also worth noting that, although the correlations between unstandardized scores for word count and duration were high and significant for both truthful and deceptive accounts (r  = .95, p <.001, in both cases), the two measures had very different relationships with word-fluency (n  = 31 in all cases). Thus the correlations between word count and speech rate were positive and significant for both truthful and deceptive accounts, r  = .40 and .44, p <.05, respectively; i.e. participants who spoke faster produced more words overall. In contrast, the correlations between account duration and speech rate were significantly lower (z  > 4.98, p < .0001),  and not significant individually for both truthful and untruthful accounts, r  = .12 and .17, ns, respectively; participants who spoke faster, producing more words per minute, did not necessarily produce longer accounts that were longer overall in terms of duration.that is, truth-tellers are able to relate the information they have at a faster rate and are thus able to report more details within the time units under consideration. In this way, therefore, standardisation for duration only partly controls for word-count, and thus one might expect results after standardisation for duration to approximate more to those for no standardisation, than standardisation for word-count. An analysis of the present results in terms of speech rate supports this interpretation; truthful accounts were also more fluent, producing significantly more words per second (M = 2.71, SD = 0.49) than deceptive accounts (M = 2.58, SD = 0.56); F (1,28) = 4.45, p = .044; η2p = .14. In this way, standardisation for duration only partly controls for word-count, and thus one might expect results after standardisation for duration to approximate more to those for no standardisation than standardisation for word-count. 
The fact that the effectiveness of the RM approach appears to weaken substantially if direct standardisation of word count is applied should perhaps not be considered surprising given that it is widely accepted that longer statements tend to sharpen the differences between liars and truth-tellers; i.e. by definition, words are the carriers of verbal cues to deception (Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, Mann, Kristen & Fisher, 2007). What is perhaps surprising, however, is that investigators have not consistently recognised the significance of this when applying RM criteria.
Although the number of people in the room also appeared to influence RM assessments, the effects were not consistently linear as might have been predicted, and they varied according to standardisation. Importantly, there was no overall support for the view that the ability of judges to discriminate between truthful and deceptive accounts would improve as the number of others in the room when the accounts were given increased. Rather, regardless of the veracity of the accounts, scores for the various non-RM indicators, and RM indicators before standardisation, tended to be highest when one interviewer was in the room. For the RM indicators, however, this trend appeared to disappear after both forms of standardisation. Without further investigation, it is difficult to come up with a ready explanation for these findings. However, one possibility is that, with these particular tasks and this situation, any adverse effects of increasing cognitive load that might be expected to interfere with executive processing might have been counterbalanced by a social facilitation effect for speech production. Speech by its very nature is fundamentally a social tool; hence people are more used to speaking out loud to another than they are, sat alone, talking to themselves. Hence speaking to another may actually be construed as a more comfortable, automatic and less demanding task than talking to oneself, or speaking alone into a microphone. However, when an extra observer is present, the situation possibly becomes more uncomfortable and demanding again, and social inhibition sets in. If this argument has any validity, then it is possible one might obtain different results using written accounts. As they stand, however, the present results appear to indicate that the presence of others neither inhibits nor facilitates the ability to distinguish truthful from deceptive accounts using RM; however, when unstandardised RM scores are used it may affect the overall size of the RM criteria scores. If shown to be reliable, this latter finding is potentially very important as it suggests that accounts generated in the presence of different numbers of people should never be treated as equivalent either within, or across studies; i.e. this is potentially a highly significant confound. 
Overall, however, perhaps the most important implication of the present findings is that future researchers and practitioners in this area should adopt a more uniform approach in dealing with word-count and duration-differences between accounts; so instead of deciding autonomously whether and how to standardise on an ad hoc basis, factors such as word-count and duration should be considered formally and systematically. In fact, given the present results, perhaps an obvious suggestion might be to avoid standardisation altogether; or even further, given word-count per se seems to significantly predict veracity, if we are not going to standardise scores for word-count, we could reasonably ask is there actually any point bothering with the RM criteria at all? As tempting as using word count alone might seem, Elntib et al. (2014) have noted that a number of findings suggest that it would be wise to exercise some caution before extolling the virtues of word-count as a cue to deception. For instance, notwithstanding the general trend that, other things being equal, truthful accounts tend to be longer than deceptive accounts, there have been studies in which truthful accounts were not longer than deceptive accounts (Sporer, 1997; Vrij, Mann, Kristen & Fisher, 2007), or were in fact shorter (Sporer & Sharman, 2006). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of linguistic cues accessed by computer programs has questioned whether word-count per se can generally be considered a reliable cue to deceptive behaviour (Hauch et al., 2014). This finding is in line with other research using the Linguistic Inquiry Word-count (LIWC) computer software which also shows that word-count per se is not necessarily a reliable cue to deception (Masip, Bethencourt, Lucas, Sánchez-San Segundo, & Herrero, 2012; Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala, & Lee, 2014). Notably also, in the present study, as in the previous study by Elntib et al., the effect size for Total RM scores (η2p  = .50), was larger than that for Word Count (.30). In other words, to predict veracity with any degree of accuracy, it would make most sense to consider the variable of word-count in conjunction with other RM cues, rather than as an alternative to them.
	Obviously, any conclusions drawn from the present results must be treated with considerable caution, particularly considering the relatively small sample size used and the stimulus materials used. For example, with regard to the latter, although the LEI procedure used here could be construed as more ecologically valid than many laboratory manipulations which have low emotional salience, the motivation for participants to lie was arguably less than would occur in real-life high stakes contexts. This may be important in that high-stakes situations in which the motivation to lie is strong may produce more reliable cues to deception (DePaulo and Morris, 2004; Porter, & ten Brinke, 2010). Also, largely because of this, we deliberately aimed to provide more explicit instructions to participants when in the deceptive-condition so that they could have a more realistic idea of what they were expected to deliver. Generally, lying, particularly in a low-stakes situation, is considered much more challenging that merely describing a genuine experience, so it was deemed important to give such advice to prevent a situation where deceptive accounts were so short as to be obviously distinguishable from the truthful ones. In terms of ecological validity, one could argue that this is more representative of real-life conditions in that truth tellers (more than liars) generally believe that ‘the truth will come out’, and hence they do not try as hard as liars to convince their audience that their account is genuine (Gilovich, Savitsky & Medvec, 1998). Notably, however, despite the explicit instructions, the deceptive accounts were still significantly shorter in all respects. An important direction for future research on this topic, therefore, is to attempt to replicate the findings with materials that are more directly relevant to real-life forensic contexts. 	
	Another variable not controlled for, but worthy of consideration in future studies of this kind, is the time delay between the occurrence of truthful events and their retrieval; there is some evidence that  recent memories receiving generally higher RM scores, hence this may be a possible confounding factor (Johnson et al., 1988; Sporer & Sharman, 2006). 
However, on first consideration, perhaps the most obvious limitation of this paper were as the small sample sizes used (i.e. in terms of both the numbers of raters and participants producing accounts). It can be noted that the use of small sample sizes in lie-detection research is not unusual, particularly a small number of raters (see, for example, Harpster, Adams & Jarvis 2009; Koper & Sahlman, 1991; Mann et al., 2002; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Villar et al., 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2001). For example, Mann et al. (2002) utilised two coders scoring clips from 16 participants; and Villar et al., used a single coder scoring four accounts from one individual. However, perhaps more problematic in this respect was the relatively small number of participants (n = 10-11) in the presence of others between subjects conditions (i.e. a feature not present in previous studies). As a general rule of thumb, with a medium effect size, a priori this would be expected to yield statistical power of around 60%, greater than 50%, but considerably less than the typical 80% often cited as an ideal in psychological studies (Wilson, VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007).  However, as in much work in this area, the idea of adding participants simply to increase the likelihood of a statistically significant effect seems somewhat arbitrary given that if an effect can only reliably be detected with large samples, or at least cannot reliably be detected in smaller samples, it is unlikely to have much practical significance in the field on a case by case basis.  
This draws attention to a more general issue that any real-life veracity assessment tool must be accurate even on a case to case basis to be of any real use in the criminal justice system; i.e. the  fact that there may be significant mean differences between large populations may have little practical significance unless reliable norms can be established that can be applied trans-situationally on an individual basis. From this viewpoint, therefore, what  really matters  most in this area are not the findings of a few studies involving hundreds of participants, but consistent trends across a number of smaller studies, preferably conducted by different researchers, using different stimulus materials. 
This latter consideration draws attention to a point also emphasized by Elntib et al.(2014), that perhaps the major problem facing RM (and other lie-detection) researchers is that of developing a protocol that forensic investigators can use to examine individual cases (see also, Masip et al., 2005). It can be noted that this requirement effectively rules out the application of alternative procedures, not considered in this paper, that attempt to control for word-count by statistically partialling out the effects of word-count, such as using length as a covariate (Sporer, & Sharman, 2006), as such procedures can only operate meaningfully at a group level.  But also, if it is the case that RM criteria are generally less discriminating after standardisation, it could still potentially be very difficult to develop normative standardisation criteria which could be used in the field to classify individual cases. Ideally, it would be useful; for example,  if single RM scores could operate in the same ways as single scores on other standardised psychometric scales (such as IQ scales, EPI, MMPI etc.). Hence if all relevant RM studies were to use some standardised measure of the raw frequencies (such as per 100 words), then, in principle, researchers might be able to establish normative data for truthful and deceptive accounts against which individual cases could be compared; for instance, one could establish percentage thresholds for each RM criterion allowing quick veracity-assessments of accounts. However, if by standardising in this way, effective discrimination is precluded, this approach will clearly not work; tthough perhaps standardisation for duration is an option worth investigating further in this respect. 
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